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Abstract
This paper establishes mixed duopoly game-theoretical models to investigate the 
economic impacts exerted by privatization in the presence of the environmental 
pollution. When the residents’ environmental preference is introduced to the public 
firm’s objective function, we mainly find that privatization may increase the public 
firm’s output, decrease the private firms’ outputs, and exert no impacts on social 
welfare. These findings run contrast to the common findings of the studies on 
privatization.  Moreover,  Cournot  competition  and  Stackelberg  competition  are 
separately analyzed to show that our findings are robust and irrelevant with the 
firms’  moves.  This  paper  highlights  the  role  the  environmental  pollution  and 
residents’  environmental  preference  play  in  determining  the  economic  impacts 
exerted by privatization.
Key words: privatization,  mixed  duopoly,  environmental  pollution,  residents’ 
environmental preference, Cournot competition, Stackelberg competition
JEL classification: H21, L33, Q58
1. Introduction
Mixed markets where publicly owned firms and privately owned firms coexist and 
compete with each other are prevalent in both developed and developing countries. 
One  can  easily  find  such  sorts  of  markets  appear  in  the  telecommunications, 
airline, rail, natural gas and postal industries. Since the 1980s, privatization waves 
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spread  worldwide  (Vickers  and Yarrow,  1988;  Ribnikar  and  Košak,  2011).  For 
example, some European countries privatized their public firms. Brazil and other 
Latin American countries employed the privatization policy to fight against high 
inflation, currency and debt crises, and activate the economy. China also carried 
out the privatization policy to reform the state-owned enterprises, which exerted a 
salient impact on the China’s economic development. 
Along  with  privatization  waves,  discussions  of  privatization  has  become  one 
of the hottest topics in economic studies. The basic motivation for privatization 
is to make the public firm operate efficiently. The objective of the public firm is 
to  maximize  social  welfare,  which  leads  to  a  higher  output  quantity  than  that 
obtained by the competitive markets. Besides, privatization can be a useful policy 
tool for the government to influence the economic efficiency and social welfare 
level (see De Fraja and Delbono, 1990). However, it is commonly known that the 
establishment of the public firm is to correct market failure. The environmental 
pollution  is  a  typically  negative  externality.  In  reality,  environmental  problems 
capture more and more attentions of governmental officials and local residents. If 
the government does not care about the residents’ environmental preference, the 
residents as voters will vote for a benevolent government who takes care of the 
environmental  quality  (see  Roelfsema,  2007).  Therefore,  when  the  government 
carries  out  the  privatization  policy,  the  residents’  environmental  preference  and 
relevant  environmental  problems  must  be  seriously  taken  into  account.  Such 
arguments are also supported by the academic studies like Beladi and Chao (2006), 
Wang and Wang (2009), Naito and Ogawa (2009), and Prašnikar et al. (2012). For 
example, as suggested by Wang and Wang (2009), in Taiwan in steel industries one 
public firm competes with one private firm and their production processes generate 
the environmental pollution. After privatization, the environmental problem may be 
even worsened and is always criticized by the general public. Therefore, as stated 
above, it is reasonable for us to integrate the environmental pollution into the public 
firm’s objective function and investigate the economic impacts of the privatization 
policy when the environmental pollution is considered by the public firm.
This  paper  tries  to  address  such  an  issue  by  employing  mixed  duopoly  game-
theoretical models. When we introduce the environmental pollution to the public 
firm’s  objective  function,  privatization  may  increase  the  public  firm’s  output, 
decrease the private firms’ outputs, and exert no impacts on social welfare, which 
runs contrast to the conventional wisdom of privatization. What’s more, we also 
show that our findings are robust and irrelevant with the firms’ moves. 
The rest parts of this paper are organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review 
the  related  studies  of  mixed  oligopoly  (duopoly).  In  Section  3,  we  separately 
investigate the impacts exerted by the privatization policy in the presence of the 
environmental pollution under Cournot (1838) competition and Stackelberg (1934) 
competition. In Section 4, we compare the outcomes under Cournot competition Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou • Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly 
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and  Stackelberg  competition  before  and  after  privatization.  In  Section  5,  some 
concluding remarks are provided.
2. Literature review
The decision concerning whether the government should privatize the public firm 
arouses the great interest of many theoretical economists. They try to address such 
an issue from various perspectives. The representative literature can be referred to 
De Fraja and Delbono (1989), White (1996), Matsumura (1998), Fjell and Heywood 
(2004), Matsumura et al. (2009), Wang et al. (2009), Wang and Wang (2009), Kato 
(2011), Barcena-Ruiz (2012), and Kato (2012). For example, De Fraja and Delbono 
(1989) contend that the number of private firms existing in the industry and the 
order  of  the  firms’  moves  (Cournot  or  Stackelberg  competition)  influence  the 
government’s decision-making in privatization. Matsumura (1998) investigates the 
optimal partial privatization level when the government carries out privatization. 
White (1996) and Fjell and Heywood (2004) explore how the government’s subsidy 
influences privatization, and they find that the firms’ moves matter for the results. 
Wang et al. (2009) argue that the firms’ moves are important for the privatization 
decision-making and the choices of government’s strategic trade policies. Wang 
and Wang  (2009)  contend  that  when  the  government  lowers  the  environmental 
tax  and  the  product  is  less  substitutable,  the  environment  is  damaged  with  the 
implementation of the privatization policy. Matsumura et al. (2009) discuss how 
the  entry  of  foreign  enterprises  affects  privatization.  Kato  (2011)  argues  that  a 
differentiated emission quota can do more to improve welfare than an emission 
tax in a mixed duopoly. Barcena-Ruiz (2012) analyzes the government’s choice of 
privatization in the situation where the public firm works as efficiently as the private 
firms. Kato (2012) finds that the optimal degrees of privatization and environmental 
damage are irrelevant with each other when the private firm is owned by domestic 
private investors, and that full privatization or full nationalization can be optimal 
when it is owned by foreign private investors. 
However,  although  some  aforementioned  studies  consider  the  situation  where 
the firms’ production process generates the environmental pollution, they largely 
neglect  to  explore  how  privatization  influences  the  whole  society  when  the 
environmental pollution and the residents’ environmental preference are introduced 
to the public firm’s objective function. Besides, although much attention has been 
paid to the employment and investment effects exerted by the privatization policy, 
the current studies greatly ignore the crucial role that the residents’ environmental 
preference plays in determining the government’s privatization policy making.4 
4  Although Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2006), Beladi and Chao (2006), Naito and Ogawa (2009), Chen 
and Wang (2010), and Wang and Wang (2009) consider the issue related to privatization in the pre-
sence of environmental pollution, they do not consider the situation discussed by this paper.Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou • Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly   
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In order to fill the current research gap, we introduce the environmental pollution 
and the residents’ environmental preference to the social welfare function and the 
public  firm’s  objective  function.  Our  approach  to  introduce  the  environmental 
pollution and the residents’ environmental preference to the social welfare function 
(i.e.,  the  objective  of  public  firm)  follows  Copeland  and  Taylor  (1994)  and 
Roelfsema (2007), and is also similar to that adopted in Naito and Ogawa (2009) 
and Wang and Wang (2009). We address the issue concerning the government’s 
privatization decision from a greatly different perspective. Our main findings are 
that  the  residents’  environmental  preference  plays  a  crucial  role  in  determining 
socioeconomic  impacts  of  privatization.  When  the  residents’  environmental 
preference is introduced to the objective function of the public firm, privatization 
may  even  raise  the  output  of  the  public  firm,  reduce  the  profit  of  the  public 
firm,  increase  the  profit  of  a  private  firm,  enhance  the  consumer  surplus,  and 
decrease the producer’s surplus. In some situations, the public firm can operate 
as efficiently as the private firm, and there is no need for the government to carry 
out  the  privatization  policy.  Cournot  competition  and  Stackelberg  competition 
are separately analyzed to show that our findings are robust and irrelevant with 
the  firms’  moves.  When  the  residents’  environmental  preference  is  included  in 
the  public  firm’s  objective  function,  privatization  exerts  significantly  different 
economic impacts, which runs contrast to the common findings of the studies on 
privatization. 
3. The theoretical analysis
Consider a single market where a public firm and a private firm coexist. These two 
firms produce the homogenous product and compete with each other.5 In reality, 
there exist such firms and their production processes generate the environmental 
pollution in some industries (see, e.g., Wang and Wang, 2009).
It is worth noting that the situation discussed in this paper is how the government’s 
privatization  policy  influences  the  whole  economy  in  the  presence  of  the 
environmental pollution. Thus, the environmental regulation policies are ignored by 
this paper. Besides, the firms’ pollution abatement costs can be treated exogenously, 
and are also neglected.
5  Different from the situation considered by the current literature where one public firm and n private 
firms operate in the same market producing the homogenous product, here we only take into account 
a market with one public firm and one private firm. This paper focuses on how the change of the resi-
dents’ environmental preference, other than the number of private firms in the market, influences the 
government’s privatization decision. Our assumption can keep our model as simple as possible, and 
the investigation of a market with one public firm and n private firms brings little additional insight 
to the present analysis. It is notable that the assumption described by this paper also fits well with the 
practical situation. Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou • Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly 
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The inverse market demand curve is assumed to be linear, which is given by:
0 1 p a q q = − − ,  (1)
where p is the price of the homogenous good produced by the public and private 
firms. a describes the market scale. q0 and q1 are the output quantities of the public 
and private firms respectively.
We assume that the public and private firms share the same quadratic cost functions, 
which are described by:
2 1
2
i i C q F = + ,  (2)
where i = 0,1, Ci is the total cost of firm i (i = 0, the public firm; i = 1, the private 
firm).  F  is  the  entry  cost.  The  above  cost  function  shares  the  property  of  the 
increasing marginal cost. The increasing marginal cost function used by this paper 
with specific forms (e.g., the variable cost being equal to 1/2 qi
2) is also used by 
Han and Ogawa (2008), Mendaz-Naya (2008), Wang et al. (2009), and Naito and 
Ogawa (2009). This paper does not consider the entry problem of the private firms. 
Reasonably, F is set to be zero.
We further assume that the production processes of both public and private firms 
will produce the environmental pollutants. The higher the output quantities, the 
more  environmental  pollutants  the  production  processes  of  public  and  private 
firms produce. For the sake of simplicity, following Taylor and Copeland (1994), 
we also use a linear function to describe the relation between the output and the 
environmental pollution. It is hypothesized that one unit of output generates one 
unit of environmental pollutant. 
Thus, we have:
0 1 E q q = + ,  (3)
where E is the environmental pollution discharged by the production procedures of 
two firms.
The profits of the public and private firms can be stated as:
2
0 0 1 0 0
1
( )
2
a q q q q π = − − − ,  (4)
2
1 0 1 1 1
1
( )
2
a q q q q π = − − − ,  (5)
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The goal of the private firm is to maximize its profit. As mentioned before, for a 
benevolent  government,  the  environmental  pollution  should  be  also  included 
in  the  social  welfare  function.  Otherwise,  if  the  environmental  pollution  in  the 
economy is serious, residents may vote for a new government who cares about 
their environmental preference. Generally speaking, the goal of the public firm is 
in accord with that of the government. That is, the goal of the public firm is to 
maximize social welfare. In this sense, the environmental pollution is introduced 
to the social welfare function, and hence treated as the objective function of the 
public firm. In other words, the goal of the public firm is to correct market failure 
and maximize social welfare. It is reasonable to see that when the environmental 
pollution is introduced to the social welfare function, it will be also included in 
the public firm’s objective function. The social welfare function (i.e., the objective 
function of the public firm) is stated as:
W CS PS E λ = + − ,  (6)
where  CS  and  PS  represent  the  consumer  surplus  and  the  producer  surplus, 
respectively. CS (namely consumer surplus) represents the consumers’ behooves in 
the social welfare function and is measured by calculating the difference between 
what consumers are willing to pay for the good relative to its market price. PS 
(namely, producer surplus) stands for the interests of producers in the social welfare 
and is reasonably measured by the sum of profits earned by both public and private 
firms. In this paper, 
2
0 1
1
( )
2
CS q q = +  and PS = π0 + π1. The parameter λ describes 
the  environmental  preference  of  the  residents.  λ  can  also  be  interpreted  as  the 
weight of the environmental pollution in the social welfare function. The higher the 
value of λ is, the more the residents take care about the environmental pollution. 
The commonly used social welfare function employed by the existent literature is a 
special case of Equation (6) and can be achieved if we let λ = 0.
Here, we would like to point out why we introduce the environmental pollution 
to the public firm’s objective function. Because this paper does not consider the 
political  manipulation,  we  treat  both  the  consumer  surplus  and  the  producer 
surplus of equal weight. In some literature on the mixed oligopoly (e.g., Naito and 
Ogawa, 2009; Wang and Wang, 2009), the environmental pollution is introduced 
to the social welfare function in a quadratic form. However, we find that if the 
environmental pollution is introduced to the social welfare function with a quadratic 
form, it only makes the calculation more complex and adds little insight. In order 
to keep the model as simple as possible, we use a linear form to accommodate the 
environmental pollution to our social welfare function. The social welfare function 
used by the present paper with a linear form of the environmental pollution is also 
utilized by Copeland and Taylor (1994) and Roelfsema (2007).Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou • Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly 
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Now,  we  will  analyze  the  socioeconomic  consequences  of  privatization  in  the 
presence of the environmental pollution. We try to address the issue by considering 
the following two cases, namely Cournot competition and Stackelberg competition. 
The significant difference between these two cases is the order of the firm’s moves. 
The current studies concerning the mixed duopoly argue that the change of the 
order of the firm’s moves will exert salient impacts or even opposite impacts (see 
White, 1996; Pal, 1998; Fjell and Heywood, 2004, Wang et al 2009). Moreover, 
Cournot  competition  and  Stackelberg  competition  are  commonly  used  by  the 
current literature to examine how the firm’s moves influence the original findings 
(see De Fraja and Delbono, 1989; Pal, 1998; Fjell and Heywood, 2004). 
a. Cournot competition
In this situation, the public firm and the private firm will simultaneously choose 
q0 and q1 to maximize their objective functions. For simplicity, this paper only 
considers  the  inner  solutions  of  our  established  theoretical  model.  Specifically, 
we know that positive solutions for variables under Cournot competition can be 
obtained when λ is restricted within the interval 
5
[0, )
8
a , and positive solutions
 
for variables under Stackerlberg competition can be founded when λ is located in 
the  interval 
20
[0, )
33
a .  But  for  the  sake  of  conducting  the  comparisons  between
 
Cournot competition and Stackelberg competition, we assume that 
20
[0, )
33
a λ∈  in
 
view of 
20 5
33 8
a a < . Thus, throughout this paper, we analyze the issues under the
 
condition that 
20
[0, )
33
a λ∈ . Such an assumption implies that the environmental
 
preference of the residents is not too high.Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou • Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly   
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The equilibrium in mixed duopoly under Cournot competition can be stated as:
0 1
2
0 1
2
2 2
2 2
2 3
, ,
5 5
(2 7 )(2 3 ) 3( )
, ,
50 50
(3 2 ) 7 7 9
, ,
50 50 25 25
8 14 3
.
25 25 25
ex ex
c c
ex ex
c c
ex ex
c c
ex
c
a a
q q
a a a
a
CS PS a a
W a a
λ λ
λ λ λ
π π
λ
λ λ
λ λ
− +
= =
+ − +
= =
−
= = + −
= − +
 
(7)
Here, qc0
ex and qc1
ex are the output quantities of the public and private firms before 
privatization, respectively. πc0
ex and πc1
ex are the profits of the public and private firms 
before privatization, respectively. CSc
ex and PSc
ex are consumer surplus and producer 
surplus before privatization, respectively. Wc
ex is the social welfare level before 
privatization.
Now we will establish Lemma 1 to summarize the economic impacts exerted by 
the  residents’  environmental  preference  in  the  mixed  duopoly  under  Cournot 
competition.
Lemma 1: In the mixed duopoly under Cournot competition, an increase in the 
residents’ environmental preference will exert the following economic impacts: 
(i)  The  output  of  the  public  firm  will  decrease  and  that  of  the  private  firm 
will  increase.  (ii)  If 
4
0
21
a λ ≤ < ,  the  profit  of  the  public  firm  will  rise;  and  if 
4 20
21 33
a a λ < < , the profit of the public firm will fall. The profit of the private 
firm will increase. (iii) The consumer surplus will be reduced. If 
7
0
18
a λ ≤ < , the
 
producer surplus will rise; and if 
7 20
18 33
a a λ < < , the producer surplus will fall.
 
(iv) Social welfare will decrease.
Proof: See Appendix A.
An increase in the residents’ environmental preference will decrease the output of 
the public firm. The higher the residents’ environmental preference is, the larger 
the negative impact the environmental pollution exerts on social welfare. At this 
time, the public firm has an incentive to reduce its output to smooth the increased 
negative impact of the environmental pollution on social welfare. Meanwhile the Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou • Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly 
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private firm behaves more aggressively and increases its output due to the reduction 
of the public firm’s output. From Equation (7) we know that an increase in the 
residents’ environmental preference will decrease the total output of both public 
and private firms, resulting in a reduction of consumer surplus. On the other hand, a 
decrease in the total output quantity leads to a higher product price. If the residents 
take  less  care  about  the  environmental  pollution  (i.e., 
4
0
21
a λ ≤ < ),  the  public 
firm  can  benefit  more  from  the  higher  product  price,  which  offsets  the  impact 
exerted by the output reduction. Hence, the profit of the public firm will increase. 
However, if the residents take more care about the environmental pollution (i.e., 
4 20
21 33
a a λ < < ), the public firm will suffer from a reduction of its output, which 
offsets the impact exerted by the increase in the product price. The profit of the 
public firm will be reduced. But for the private firm, it will take both advantages 
of the increased output and the decreased product price, and thus its profit will 
rise. It is reasonable to see that if the residents take less care of the environmental 
pollution (i.e., 
7
0
18
a λ ≤ < ), the decrease of the public firm’s profit will exceed 
the increase of the private’s profit and the producer surplus will be reduced. If the 
residents take more care about the environmental pollution (i.e., 
7 20
18 33
a a λ < < ), 
the opposite will occur and the producer surplus will increase. Besides, due to an 
increase in the residents’ environmental preference, the residents will suffer more 
from the environmental pollution and social welfare will decrease.
In the privatized duopoly under Cournot competition, the equilibrium is described 
by:
 
0 1
2
0 1
2 2
2
1
,
4
3
,
32
1 3
, ,
8 16
5
.
16 2
pri pri
c c
pri pri
c c
pri pri
c c
pri
c
q q a
a
CS a PS a
a
W a
π π
λ
= =
= =
= =
= −
  (8)
Here, qc0
pri and qc1
pri are the output quantities of the public and private firms after 
privatization, respectively. πc0
pri and πc1
pri are the profits of the public and private 
firms after privatization, respectively. CSc
pri and PSc
pri are consumer surplus and Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou • Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly   
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producer surplus after privatization, respectively. Wc
pri is the social welfare level 
after privatization.
After privatization, the objectives of two firms are both profit maximization. Hence, 
their outputs and profits, as well as the consumer surplus and producer surplus, 
are  irrelevant  to  the  residents’  environmental  preference.  However,  because  the 
residents’ environmental preference is introduced to the social welfare function, the 
consumers will suffer more from the environmental pollution due to an increase in 
the residents’ environmental preference. This leads to a reduction of social welfare.
Proposition  1  is  given  to  investigate  the  socioeconomic  impacts  exerted  by 
privatization.
Proposition  1:  In  the  mixed  duopoly  under  Cournot  competition,  if 
1
4
a λ = ,
 
privatization will exert no economic impacts. Otherwise, privatization will exert 
the following economic impacts: (i) If 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < , privatization will decrease the
output of the public firm and raise that of the private firm; and if 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < ,
privatization  will  increase  the  output  of  the  public  firm  and  reduce  that  of  the 
private  firm.  (ii)  If 
11
0
84
a λ ≤ <   and 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < ,  privatization  will  increase 
the public firm’s profit; and if 
11 1
84 4
a a λ < < , privatization will reduce the public 
firm’s  profit.  If 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < ,  privatization  will  decrease  the  profit  of  the  private 
firm;  and  if 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < ,  privatization  will  increase  the  profit  of  the  private 
firm. (iii) If 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < , privatization will decrease the consumer surplus; and if 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < ,  privatization  will  increase  the  consumer  surplus.  If 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ <
 
and 
19 20
36 33
a a λ < < ,  privatization  will  increase  the  producer  surplus;  and  if
1 19
4 36
a a λ < < , privatization will reduce the producer surplus. (iv) if 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ <
 
and 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < , privatization will decrease social welfare. 
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The  key  point  to  understand  Proposition  1  is  to  know  how  privatization 
influences the output quantities of public and private firms. In the situation that 
the environmental pollution is introduced to the objective function of the public 
firm, the public firm will face a trade-off between increasing its output to raise the 
consumer surplus and decreasing its output to reduce the environmental pollution. 
If the residents care less about the environmental pollution, that is, the residents’ 
environmental preference is relatively small (i.e., 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < ), the public firm will 
take more care about the residents’ surplus. Therefore, the public firm’s output will 
be higher than the socially efficient level and privatization will decrease the output 
of the public firm, thus making the public firm work efficiently after privatization. 
The decrease of the public firm’s output will inspire the private firm to raise its 
output after privatization. This is in accord with the motivation of privatization 
and the conventional wisdom of privatization. However, if the residents care more 
about the environmental pollution, that is, the residents’ environmental preference 
is large enough (i.e., 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < ), the public firm will take more care about the 
environmental pollution. Therefore, the public firm’s output will be lower than the 
socially efficient level and privatization will increase the output of the public firm. 
Therefore, when the environmental pollution is taken into account by the objective 
function of the public firm, it is possible for the public firm (the private firm) to 
raise (decrease) its output after privatization. It is not hard to see the establishment 
of the second, third and fourth parts of Proposition 1.
It is notable that if we set λ = 0, from Equation (6) we know that in this situation, 
the environmental pollution will exert no impact on social welfare. This is the 
simplest case to discuss the socioeconomic impacts exerted by privatization. From 
Proposition 1 we know that if the residents take less care about the environmental 
pollution, the results due to privatization will be the same as those obtained by the 
simplest case where the environmental pollution is not introduced to the social 
welfare function. However, if the residents take more care about the environmental 
pollution, the opposite findings will be obtained. From the first part of Proposition 
1 we can get that privatization can even increase the output of the public firm. From 
the second part of Proposition 1, it is possible that the profit of the public firm will 
decrease and that of the private firm will increase after privatization. From the third 
part of Proposition 1, it is also shown that privatization will increase the consumer 
surplus  and  decrease  the  producer  surplus.  Therefore,  we  can  conclude  that  if 
the environmental pollution is embedded in the public firm’s objective function, 
privatization  will  exert  significantly  different  socioeconomic  impacts,  compared 
with the situation that the residents’ environmental preference is not taken into 
account. Here we would like to highlight that for some value of the residents’ 
preference (e.g., 
1
4
a λ = ), the public firm can operate as efficiently as the private
 
firm and there is no need for the government to carry out the privatization policy.Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou • Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly   
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b. Stackelberg competition
In this case, we will consider the following two-stage game. In the first stage, the 
public firm chooses q0 to maximize the social welfare function. In the second stage, 
given the value of q0, the private firm chooses q1 to maximize its profit function. 
In this two-stage game, the public firm is a leader, and its leadership can be gained 
due  to  the  historical,  technological  or  certain  legal  reasons,  hence  gaining  the 
competitive advantage over the private firm (see Fjell and Heywood, 2004). In 
reality, large public firms can usually be the leaders in their industries, and even 
after privatization, they still are the private leaders in the same industries (see Fjell 
and Heywood, 2004). In order to get the inner solutions of our established model 
under Stackelberg competition, we assume that 
20
[0, )
33
a λ∈ .
 
The equilibrium in mixed duopoly under Stackelberg competition is given by:
0 1
2
0 1
2
2 2
2 2
5 3 3 1
, ,
14 7 14 7
1 1 5 3 3 3
( )( ), ( ) ,
4 2 14 7 98 2
2(2 ) 31 8 9
, ,
49 196 49 49
9 4 1
.
28 7 7
ex ex
s s
ex ex
s s
ex ex
s s
ex
s
q a q a
a a a
a
CS PS a a
W a a
λ λ
π λ λ π λ
λ
λ λ
λ λ
= − = +
= + − = +
−
= = + −
= − +
   (9)
Here, qs0
ex
 and qs1
ex are the output quantities of the public and private firms before 
privatization, respectively. πs0
ex and πs1
ex are the profits of the public and private firms 
before privatization, respectively. CSs
ex and PSs
ex are consumer surplus and producer 
surplus before privatization, respectively. Ws
ex is the social welfare level before 
privatization.
Now we use Lemma 2 to summarize the economic impacts exerted by the residents’ 
environmental preference in the mixed duopoly under Stackelberg competition.
Lemma 2: In the mixed duopoly under Stackelberg competition, an increase in the 
residents’ environmental preference will exert the following economic impacts: 
(i)  The  output  of  the  public  firm  will  decrease  and  that  of  the  private  firm   
will  increase;  (ii)  If 
1
0
6
a λ ≤ < ,  the  profit  of  the  public  firm  will  rise;  and  if
1 20
6 33
a a λ < < , the profit of the public firm will fall. The profit of the private firm 
will increase; (iii) The consumer surplus will decrease. If 
4
0
9
a λ ≤ < , the producerJiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou • Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly 
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surplus will rise; and if 
4 20
9 33
a a λ < < , the producer surplus will fall. (iv) The 
social welfare will decrease.
Proof: See Appendix C.
The economic explanations for Lemma 2 are similar to those for Lemma 1. In order 
to save space, here we do not give detailed analysis. 
In the private duopoly under Stackelberg competition, the equilibrium is stated as:
0 1
2 2
0 1
2 2
2
2 5
, ,
7 21
84 75
, ,
882 882
121 53
, ,
882 294
20 11
.
63 21
pri pri
s s
pri pri
s s
pri pri
s s
pri
s
q a q a
a a
CS a PS a
W a a
π π
λ
= =
= =
= =
= −
  (10)
Here, qs0
pri and qs1
pri are the output quantities of the public and private firms after 
privatization, respectively. πs0
pri and πs1
pri are the profits of the public and private 
firms after privatization, respectively. CSs
pri and PSs
pri are consumer surplus and 
producer surplus after privatization, respectively. Ws
pri is the social welfare level 
after privatization.
The analysis of Equation (10) is similar to that of Equation (8). After privatization, 
the output quantities and profits of the two firms, as well as the consumer surplus 
and producer surplus, are irrelevant to the residents’ environmental preference. The 
change of the residents’ environmental preference only influences social welfare. 
Thus, an increase in the residents’ environmental preference means that residents 
will pay more attention to the environmental pollution, and ceteris paribus, social 
welfare will decrease.
We will establish Proposition 2 to investigate the socioeconomic impacts exerted by 
privatization.
Proposition  2:  In  the  mixed  duopoly  under  Stackelberg  competition,  if 
1
6
a λ = ,
then  privatization  will  exert  no  economic  impacts.  Otherwise,  privatization 
will  exert  the  following  economic  impacts:  (i)  If 
1
0
6
a λ ≤ < ,  privatization
will reduce the output of the public firm and raise that of the private firm; and if Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou • Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly   
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1 20
6 33
a a λ < < ,  privatization  will  increase  the  output  of  the  public  firm  and 
decrease that of the private firm; (ii) If 
20
0
33
a λ ≤ < , privatization will decrease 
the profit of the public firm. If 
1
0
6
a λ ≤ < , privatization will increase the profit
of  the  private  firm;  and  if 
1 20
6 33
a a λ < < ,  privatization  will  decrease  the  profit
of the private firm. (iii) If 
1
0
6
a λ ≤ < , privatization will decrease the consumer
surplus;  and  if 
1 20
6 33
a a λ < < ,  privatization  will  increase  the  consumer
surplus.  If 
1
0
6
a λ ≤ < ,  privatization  will  increase  the  producer  surplus,  and  if 
1 20
6 33
a a λ < < , privatization will reduce the producer surplus. (iv) If 
1
0
6
a λ ≤ <
 
and 
1 20
6 33
a a λ < < , privatization will decrease social welfare. 
Proof: See Appendix D.
The economic intuitions behind Proposition 2 are almost the same as those depicted 
by  Proposition  1.  Even  under  Stackelberg  competition,  privatization  may  also 
increase the output of the public firm, decrease the profit of the public firm, raise 
the profit the private firm, increase the residents’ surplus, and reduce the producer 
surplus. These findings are quite different from those obtained by the situation that 
λ = 0 under Stackelberg competition. Obviously, for some value of the residents’ 
preference (e.g., 
1
6
a λ = ), the public firm can work as efficiently as the private 
firm, and there is no need for the government to carry out the privatization policy. 
It is worth noting that under Stackelberg competition, the public firm will have 
the  first  mover  advantage,  and  compared  with  the  situation  under  Cournot 
competition, the public firm’s behavior will generate larger impact on the private 
firm. It is more likely for the public firm to raise its output after privatization under 
Stackelberg competition (recall that the critical value of λ is 
1
6
a) than that under 
Cournot competition (recall that the critical value of λ is 
1
4
a). Under Stackelberg 
competition, the public firm is more sensitive to the environmental pollution and 
the residents’ environmental preference.Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou • Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly 
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Now we use Table 1 to summarize the main findings by Proposition 1 and Proposi-
tion 2.6
Table 1: Impacts  of  privatization  under  Cournot  competition  and  Stackelberg 
competition
Competition 
modes
Cournot Competition Stackelberg Competition
Impacts Increase Decrease Increase Decrease
Public firm’s 
output
1 20
4 33
a a λ < <
1
0
4
a λ ≤ <
1 20
6 33
a a λ < <
1
0
6
a λ ≤ <
Private firm’s 
output
1
0
4
a λ ≤ <
1 20
4 33
a a λ < <
1
0
6
a λ ≤ <
1 20
6 33
a a λ < <
Public firm’s 
profit
11
0
84
a λ ≤ < ,
 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < <
11 1
84 4
a a λ < < ／
20
0
33
a λ ≤ <
Private firm’s 
profit
1 20
4 33
a a λ < <
1
0
4
a λ ≤ <
1
0
6
a λ ≤ <
1 20
6 33
a a λ < <
Consumer 
surplus
1 20
4 33
a a λ < <
1
0
4
a λ ≤ <
1 20
6 33
a a λ < <
1
0
6
a λ ≤ <
Producer 
surplus
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < ,
 
19 20
36 33
a a λ < <
1 19
4 36
a a λ < <
1
0
6
a λ ≤ <
1 20
6 33
a a λ < <
Social 
welfare ／
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < ,
1 20
4 33
a a λ < <
／
1
0
6
a λ ≤ < ,
1 20
6 33
a a λ < <
Source: Authors’ calculation
From Table 1, we can conclude that when the residents’ environmental preference is 
introduced to the objective function of the public firm, privatization may exert the 
significantly different economic impacts, which runs contrast to the conventional 
wisdom  of  privatization.  Examined  by  Cournot  competition  and  Stackelberg 
competition, our findings are proved to be irrelevant with firms’ moves.
6  We ignore the situation that there is no need for the government to conduct the privatization policy 
(i.e., 
1
4
a λ =  in Cournot competition case and 
1
6
a λ =  in Stackelberg competition case) in Table 1.Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou • Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly   
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4. Results and discussion
In this section, we will conduct the comparisons of the firms’ output quantities 
and profits, residents’ surplus, producer surplus, and social welfare under Cournot 
competition and Stackelberg competition before and after privatization.
First, we will compare the firms’ output quantities and profits, residents’ surplus, 
producer surplus and social welfare under Cournot competition with those under 
Stackelberg competition, which are summarized by Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: In the mixed duopoly under Stackelberg competition and Cournot 
competition: (i) If 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < , the public (private) firm’s output under Stackelberg
 
competition  will  be  less  (larger)  than  that  under  Cournot  competition;  and  if 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < , the public (private) firm’s output under Stackelberg competition
 
will be larger (less) than that under Cournot competition. (ii) If 
13
0
72
a λ ≤ <
 
and 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < , the public firm will gain more profit under Stackelberg
 
competition; 
and  if 
13 1
72 4
a a λ < < ,  the  public  firm  will  gain  more  profit  under
 
Cournot 
competition. If 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < , the private firm will gain more profit
 
under Stackelberg 
competition; and if 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < , the private firm will gain more profit under 
Cournot competition. (iii) If 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < , Stackelberg competition will lead to a 
lower  consumer  surplus;  and  if 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < ,  Cournot  competition  will  result 
in  a  lower  consumer  surplus.  If 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ <   and 
89 20
216 33
a a λ < < ,  Stackelberg 
competition  will  enjoy  a  higher  producer  surplus;  and  if 
1 89
4 216
a a λ < < , 
Cournot competition will have a higher producer surplus. (iv) If 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ <  and 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < ,  the  social  welfare  level  under  Stackelberg  competition  will  be 
larger than that under Cournot competition.
Proof: See Appendix E.Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou • Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly 
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Figure 1: Comparisons of Cournot competition and Stackelberg competition before   
  privatization
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From Proposition 3, we see that it is hard to verify that Stackelberg competition is 
better than Cournot competition, although the social welfare level under Stackelberg 
competition is larger than (or at least equal to) that under Cournot competition. The 
comparisons among the firms’ output quantities and profits, residents’ surplus and 
producer surplus between Cournot competition and Stackelberg competition before 
privatization are largely determined by the residents’ environmental preference. We 
use Figure 1 to summarize the main findings of Proposition 3. 
After privatization, both the public firm and the private firm are profit maximizers. 
The firms’ output quantities and profits, residents’ surplus and producer surplus are 
all irrelevant to the environmental pollution. The comparisons among firms’ output 
quantities  and  profits,  residents’  surplus  and  producer  surplus  between  Cournot 
competition and Stackelberg competition can be easily found in the Microeconomic 
textbook.  The  comparisons  between  the  social  welfare  levels  under  Cournot 
competition and Stackelberg competition will be summarized by Proposition 4.
Proposition  4:  In  the  mixed  duopoly,  if 
5
0
24
a λ ≤ < ,  then  the  Stackelberg
 
competition  will  have  a  higher  social  welfare  level  after  privatization.  If 
5 20
24 33
a a λ < < , then the Cournot competition will have a higher social welfare 
level after privatization.
Proof: See Appendix F. 
If we set λ = 0, from Equation (6) we know that in this situation, the environmental 
pollution will exert no impact on social welfare. This is the common case discussed 
by the Microeconomic textbook, which contends that the social welfare level under 
the Stackelberg competition is higher than that under Cournot competition. It is also 
common to know that the total output quantity under Stackelberg competition is 
larger than that under Cournot competition. 
However,  when  we  introduce  the  environmental  pollution  to  the  social  welfare 
function,  the  society  under  Stackelberg  competition  will  suffer  more  from  the 
environmental pollution, and the welfare impact exerted by privatization will be 
ambiguous. The main findings of Proposition 4 can be illustrated by Figure 2.Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou • Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly 
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Figure 2:  Welfare comparisons of Cournot competition and Stackelberg competition   
  after privatization
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From Figure 2 we know that if the residents care less about the environment and 
the residents’ environmental preference is relatively low (i.e., 
5
0
24
a λ ≤ < ), the 
environmental pollution will have a trivially negative impact on social welfare, and 
the finding obtained by the textbook can also be established. However, if they also 
care more about the environment, and the residents’ environmental preference is 
sufficiently high (i.e., 
5 20
24 33
a a λ < < ), the environmental pollution will exert a 
non-negligible negative impact on social welfare, and the textbook finding cannot 
be achieved. In this situation, the social welfare level under the Cournot competition 
will be higher than that under Stackelberg competition.
Therefore, we can conclude that if the residents care less about the environment, 
after privatization Stackelberg competition will be better than Cournot competition 
from the perspective of social welfare. However, if the residents care more about 
the environment, the opposite will occur.Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou • Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly   
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5. Conclusion
On  the  one  hand,  along  with  more  and  more  serious  environmental  problem 
prevailing in the real world, the environmental pollution attracts more and more 
attentions  of  both  government  officials  and  local  residents.  On  the  other  hand, 
privatization  of  public  firms,  working  as  a  policy  instrument  aimed  at  raising 
the  economic  efficiency,  prevails  in  both  developing  and  developed  countries. 
Our  hypothesis  is  that  when  we  introduce  the  environmental  pollution  and  the 
residents’ environmental preference to the public firm’s objective function, some 
results running contrast to the common findings of the studies on privatization can 
be achieved. This paper establishes game-theoretical models in the framework of 
Cournot and Stackelberg competitions to confirm the validity of our hypothesis.
The issue addressed by this paper and the angle of view on the issue are largely 
ignored by the current studies of privatization in the framework of mixed oligopoly. 
Thus,  we  contribute  to  the  works  on  privatization  in  the  framework  of  mixed 
oligopoly  by  introducing  the  residents’  environmental  preference  to  the  public 
firm’s  objective  function.  As  expected,  our  analytical  extensions  challenge  the 
common results obtained by the literature on privatization. In addition, although 
the  existent  studies  have  accommodated  the  environmental  pollution  and  the 
residents’  environmental  preference  to  the  social  welfare  function,  but  they 
seldom conduct the analysis in the framework of mixed duopoly. Our paper is a 
beneficial supplement to this strand of literature, and we highlight the role that 
the environmental pollution and the residents’ environmental preference play in 
a mixed duopoly market. Much attention has rested on the issues related to the 
employment and investment effects during the privatization process, but little has 
been paid to the environmental problems. As shown by Beladi and Chao (2006), 
Naito  and  Ogawa  (2009), Wang  and Wang  (2009)  and  Prašnikar  et  al.  (2012), 
environmental issues are also of great importance when the government conducts 
its privatization policy. Moreover, our findings indicate that when residents pay 
much attention to the environmental problems, they can benefit from government’s 
privatization policy. 
Here we would like to point out that the establishment of our findings is based on 
the assumptions that the firms’ cost functions are quadric, the firms’ outputs are 
homogenous,  only  one  public  firm  prevails,  and  the  environmental  pollution  is 
linearly introduced to the social welfare function. If these assumptions are relaxed, 
will our results still be robust? Besides, due to non-availability of empirical data, 
we cannot conduct an empirical analysis to test our findings. It cannot deny that the 
above-mentioned points are our research limitations, but they also motivate us to 
relax these assumptions and find relevant data in the future studies.
This  paper  highlights  that  when  the  government  carries  out  some  development 
policies,  their  environmental  impacts  cannot  be  neglected.  When  the  residents’ Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou • Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly 
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environmental preference is accommodated to the public firm’s objective function, 
it is possible for the public firm to under-produce. Privatization is not always a good 
way to improve the production efficiency of the public firm . When residents pay less 
attention to the environmental problems, privatization is beneficial to the producers’ 
interests. When the government carries out the privatization policy, they should take 
the resident’s environmental preference into account, make a tradeoff between the 
benefits of residents and firms, and decide whose interests should be placed as the 
priority during the privatization process. Therefore, in the situation discussed by this 
paper, the government should take more care of its privatization decision.
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Privatizacija i zagađenje okoliša u mješovitom duopolu 
Jiancai Pi1, Li Yang2, Yu Zhou3 
Sažetak
U radu se uspostavlja mješoviti duopol model teorijskih igara kako bi se istražili 
ekonomski  učinci  privatizacije  u  prisutnosti  onečišćenja  okoliša.  Kad  se 
preferiranje zaštite okoliša uključi u funkciju cilja javnog poduzeća, nalazimo da 
privatizacija  povećava  proizvodnju  javnih  poduzeća,  smanjuje  proizvodnju 
privatnih poduzeća i nema utjecaja na socijalnu skrb. Rezultati ovog istraživanja u 
suprotnosti  su  s  uobičajenim  rezultatima  istraživanja  o  privatizaciji.  Štoviše, 
Cournotova konkurencija i Stackelbergova konkurencija analiziraju se zasebno 
kako bi se pokazalo da su naši rezultati robusni i irelevantni u odnosu na poslovne 
poteze poduzeća. U radu se ističe uloga onečišćenja okoliša i preferiranje zaštite 
okoliša  stanovništva  u  određivanju  ekonomskog  utjecaja  prouzročenog  privati-
zacijom. 
Ključne riječi: privatizacija, mješoviti duopoly, zagađenje okoliša, preferiranje 
zaštite  okoliša  stanovništva,  Cournotova  konkurencija,  Stackelbergova  konku-
rencija
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Appendix A
Differentiating Equation (7) with respect to λ yields:
0 3
0
5
ex
c q
λ
∂
= − <
∂
, 
1 1
0
5
ex
c q
λ
∂
= >
∂
; 
0 8 42
50
ex
c a π λ
λ
∂ −
=
∂
,  if 
4
0
21
a λ ≤ < ,  then
 
0 0
ex
c π
λ
∂
>
∂
,  and  if 
4 20
21 33
a a λ < < ,  then 
0 0
ex
c π
λ
∂
<
∂
; 
1 3( )
0
25
ex
c a π λ
λ
∂ +
= >
∂
; 
6 4
0
25
ex
c CS a λ
λ
∂ −
= − <
∂
; 
7 18
25 25
ex
c PS
a λ
λ
∂
= −
∂
, if 
7
0
18
a λ ≤ < , then  0
ex
c PS
λ
∂
>
∂
, 
and if 
7 20
18 33
a a λ < < , then  0
ex
c PS
λ
∂
<
∂
; 
14 6
0
25 25
ex
c W
a λ
λ
∂
= − + <
∂
.  
Appendix B
From Equation (7) and Equation (8), we have:
0 0
3 3
20 5
ex pri
c c q q a λ − = − , if 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < , then  0 0
ex pri
c c q q >  and if 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < <
, 
then  0 0
ex pri
c c q q < . 
1 1
1 1
20 5
ex pri
c c q q a λ − = − + , if 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < , then  1 1
ex pri
c c q q <  and if 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < , 
then  1 1
ex pri
c c q q > . 
2 2
2
0 0
4 8 21 3
50 32
ex pri
c c
a a
a
λ λ
π π
+ −
− = − . When 
11
84
a λ =   and
1
4
a λ = ,  we  have
 
0 0
ex pri
c c π π = . 
0 0 ( ) 8 42
50
ex pri
c c a π π λ
λ
∂ − −
=
∂
. If 
4
21
a λ < , then 
0 0 ( )
0
ex pri
c c π π
λ
∂ −
>
∂
 and if 
4
21
a λ > , 
then 
0 0 ( )
0
ex pri
c c π π
λ
∂ −
<
∂
.
 
Thus,  we  have  if 
11
0
84
a λ ≤ <   and 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < ,  then  0 0
ex pri
c c π π < ,  and  if
 
11 1
84 4
a a λ < < , then  0 0
ex pri
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2
2
1 1
3( ) 3
50 32
ex pri
c c
a
a
λ
π π
+
− = − . When 
1
4
a λ = , we have  1 1
ex pri
c c π π = . From the 
proof of Lemma 1 we know, 
1 3( )
0
25
ex
c a π λ
λ
∂ +
= >
∂
. Thus, if 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < , then
 
1 1
ex pri
c c π π < , and if 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < , then  1 1
ex pri
c c π π > .
2
2 (3 2 ) 1
50 8
ex pri
c c
a
CS CS a
λ −
− = − . When 
1
4
a λ = , we have 
ex pri
c c CS CS = . From
 
the proof of Lemma 1 we know, 
6 4
0
25
ex
c CS a λ
λ
∂ −
= − <
∂
. Thus, if 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < , 
then 
ex pri
c c CS CS > , and if 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < , then 
ex pri
c c CS CS < .
2 2 3 7 9
800 25 25
ex pri
c c PS PS a aλ λ − = − + − .  When 
1
4
a λ =   and 
19
36
a λ = , 
ex pri
c c PS PS = . 
( ) 7 18
25 25
ex pri
c c PS PS
a λ
λ
∂ −
= −
∂
. If 
7
18
a λ < , then 
( )
0
ex pri
c c PS PS
λ
∂ −
>
∂
 and if
 
7
18
a λ > , then 
( )
0
ex pri
c c PS PS
λ
∂ −
<
∂
. 
Thus,  we  have  if 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ <   and 
19 20
36 33
a a λ < < , 
ex pri
c c PS PS < ,  and  if
 
1 19
4 36
a a λ < < , 
ex pri
c c PS PS > .
2 2 3 3 3
400 50 25
ex pri
c c W W a aλ λ − = − + .  When 
1
4
a λ = ,  we  have 
ex pri
c c W W = . 
It is not hard to know that 
( ) 3 6
50 25
ex pri
c c W W
a λ
λ
∂ −
= − +
∂
, if 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < , then 
( )
0
ex pri
c c W W
λ
∂ −
<
∂
,  and 
ex pri
c c W W > ;  and  if 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < ,  then
 
( )
0
ex pri
c c W W
λ
∂ −
>
∂
, and 
ex pri
c c W W > .
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Appendix C
Differentiating Equation (9) with respect to λ yields:
0 3
0
7
ex
s q
λ
∂
= − <
∂
, 
1 1
0
7
ex
s q
λ
∂
= >
∂
;
 
0 1 3
14 7
ex
s a
π
λ
λ
∂
= −
∂
, if 
1
0
6
a λ ≤ < , then 
0 0
ex
s π
λ
∂
>
∂
; and if 
1 20
6 33
a a λ < < , then 
0 0
ex
s π
λ
∂
<
∂
.
1 9 3
0
98 49
ex
s a
π
λ
λ
∂
= + >
∂
; 
4 8
0
49 49
ex
s CS
a λ
λ
∂
= − <
∂
;
8 18
49 49
ex
s PS
a λ
λ
∂
= −
∂
, if 
4
0
9
a λ ≤ < , then  0
ex
s PS
λ
∂
>
∂
; and if 
4 20
9 33
a a λ < < , 
then  0
ex
s PS
λ
∂
<
∂
.
4 2
0
7 7
ex
s W
a λ
λ
∂
= − + <
∂
.  
Appendix D
From Equation (9) and Equation (10), we know:
0 0
1 3
14 7
ex pri
s s q q a λ − = − , if 
1
0
6
a λ ≤ < , then  0 0
ex pri
s s q q > , and if 
1 20
6 33
a a λ < < , 
then  0 0
ex pri
c c q q < . 
1 1
1 1
42 7
ex pri
s s q q a λ − = − + , if 
1
0
6
a λ ≤ < , then  1 1
ex pri
s s q q < ; and if 
1 20
6 33
a a λ < < , 
then  1 1
ex pri
s s q q > . 
2 2 2
0 0
5 1 3 2
56 14 14 21
ex pri
s s a a a π π λ λ − = + − − .  Only  when 
1
6
a λ =   can  we  have 
0 0
ex pri
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0 0 ( ) 6
14
ex pri
s s a π π λ
λ
∂ − −
=
∂
.  If 
1
6
a λ < ,  then 
0 0 ( )
0
ex pri
c c π π
λ
∂ −
>
∂
;  and  if 
1
6
a λ > , 
then 
0 0 ( )
0
ex pri
c c π π
λ
∂ −
<
∂
.  Thus,  we  have  if 
20
0
33
a λ ≤ <   and 
1
6
a λ ≠ ,  then 
0 0
ex pri
s s π π < ; and if 
1
6
a λ = , then  0 0
ex pri
s s π π = .
2 2
1 1
3 3 25
( )
98 2 294
ex pri
s s a a π π λ − = + − . When 
1
6
a λ = , we have  1 1
ex pri
s s π π = . From
 
the proof of Lemma 2 we know, 
1 9 3
0
98 49
ex
s a
π
λ
λ
∂
= + >
∂
. Thus, if 
1
0
6
a λ ≤ < , 
then  1 1
ex pri
s s π π < ; and if 
1 20
6 33
a a λ < < , then  1 1
ex pri
s s π π > .
2
2 2(2 ) 121
49 882
ex pri
s s
a
CS CS a
λ −
− = − .  When 
1
6
a λ = ,  we  have 
ex pri
s s CS CS = . 
From  the  proof  of  Lemma  2  we  know, 
4 8
0
49 49
ex
s CS
a λ
λ
∂
= − <
∂
.  Thus,  if 
1
0
6
a λ ≤ < , then 
ex pri
s s CS CS > ; and if 
1 20
6 33
a a λ < < , then 
ex pri
s s CS CS < .
2 2 13 8 9
588 49 49
ex pri
s s PS PS a aλ λ − = − + − . When 
1
6
a λ = , 
ex pri
s s PS PS = .
( ) 8 18
49 49
ex pri
s s PS PS
a λ
λ
∂ −
= −
∂
. If 
4
9
a λ < , then 
( )
0
ex pri
s s PS PS
λ
∂ −
>
∂
; and if
 
4
9
a λ > , then 
( )
0
ex pri
s s PS PS
λ
∂ −
<
∂
. Thus, if 
1
0
6
a λ ≤ < , then 
ex pri
s s PS PS < , 
and if 
1 20
6 33
a a λ < < , then 
ex pri
s s PS PS > .
2 2 1 1 1
252 21 7
ex pri
s s W W a aλ λ − = − + . When 
1
6
a λ = , we have 
ex pri
s s W W = . It is
 
not  hard  to  know  that 
( ) 1 2
21 7
ex pri
s s W W
a λ
λ
∂ −
= − +
∂
.  If 
1
0
6
a λ ≤ < ,  then
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( )
0
ex pri
s s W W
λ
∂ −
<
∂
  and 
ex pri
s s W W > ;  and  if 
1 20
6 33
a a λ < < ,  then
 
( )
0
ex pri
s s W W
λ
∂ −
>
∂
 and 
ex pri
s s W W > . 
 
Appendix E
From Equation (7) and Equation (9), we know:
0 0
3 6
70 35
ex ex
c s q q a λ − = − , 
0 0 ( ) 6
0
35
ex ex
c s q q
λ
∂ −
= − <
∂
, if 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < , then  0 0
ex ex
c s q q > ; 
and if 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < , then  0 0
ex ex
c s q q < .
1 1
1 2
70 35
ex ex
c s q q a λ − = − + , 
1 1 ( ) 2
0
35
ex ex
c s q q
λ
∂ −
= >
∂
, if 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < , then  1 1
ex ex
c s q q < ; 
and if  
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < , then  1 1
ex ex
c s q q > . 
2 2
0 0
13 31 36
1400 350 175
ex ex
c s a a π π λ λ − = − + − . When
1
4
a λ = and
13
72
a λ = , we have
 
0 0
ex ex
c s π π = . 
0 0 ( ) 31 72
350 175
ex ex
c s a
π π
λ
λ
∂ −
= −
∂
. If 
31
144
a λ < , then 
0 0 ( )
0
ex pri
c c π π
λ
∂ −
>
∂
; 
and  if 
31
144
a λ > ,  then 
0 0 ( )
0
ex ex
c s π π
λ
∂ −
<
∂
.  Thus,  if 
13
0
72
a λ ≤ <   and
 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < ,  then  0 0
ex ex
c s π π < ;  and  if 
13 1
72 4
a a λ < < ,  then  0 0
ex ex
c s π π > .   
 
2 2
1 1
87 276 288
9800
ex ex
c s
a aλ λ
π π
− + +
− = .  When 
1
4
a λ = ,  we  have  1 1
ex ex
c s π π = . 
1 1 ( ) 276 576
9800
ex ex
c s a π π λ
λ
∂ − +
=
∂
, 
0 0 ( )
0
ex pri
c c π π
λ
∂ −
>
∂
.  Thus,  if 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < ,  then 
1 1
ex ex
c s π π < ; and if 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < , then  1 1
ex ex
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2 2 41 188 96
2450
ex ex
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a a
CS CS
λ λ − +
− = .  When 
1
4
a λ = ,  we  have 
ex ex
c s CS CS = . 
( ) 188 192
2450 2450
ex ex
c s CS CS
a λ
λ
∂ −
= − +
∂
, if 
20
0
33
a λ ≤ < , then 
( )
ex ex
c s CS CS
λ
∂ −
∂  
< 0. 
Thus,  if 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < ,  then 
ex ex
c s CS CS > ;  and  if 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < ,  then
 
ex ex
c s CS CS < .
2 2 89 572 864
4900
ex ex
c s
a a
PS PS
λ λ − +
− = − .  When 
1
4
a λ =   and 
89
216
a λ = , 
ex ex
c s PS PS = . 
( ) 572 864
4900 2450
ex ex
c s PS PS
a λ
λ
∂ −
= −
∂
.  If 
143
432
a λ < ,  then 
( )
0
ex ex
c s PS PS
λ
∂ −
>
∂
;  and  if 
143
432
a λ > ,  then 
( )
0
ex ex
c s PS PS
λ
∂ −
<
∂
.  Thus,  if 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ <  and 
89 20
216 33
a a λ < < , then 
ex ex
c s PS PS < ; and if 
1 89
4 216
a a λ < < , 
then 
ex ex
c s PS PS > .
2 2 1 2 4
_
700 175 175
ex ex
c s W W a aλ λ − = − + . When 
1
4
a λ = , we have 
ex ex
c s W W = . 
It  is  easy  to  know  that 
( ) 2 8
175 175
ex ex
c s W W
a λ
λ
∂ −
= −
∂
.  If 
1
0
4
a λ ≤ < ,  then 
( )
0
ex ex
c s W W
λ
∂ −
>
∂
  and 
ex ex
c s W W < ;  and  if 
1 20
4 33
a a λ < < ,  then 
( )
0
ex ex
c s W W
λ
∂ −
<
∂
 and 
ex ex
c s W W < . 
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Appendix F
From Equation (7) and Equation (9), we know:
2 1 5
42 1008
pri pri
c s W W a a λ − = − . 
( ) 1
0
42
pri pri
c s W W
a
λ
∂ −
= >
∂
.  If 
5
0
24
a λ ≤ < , 
then 
pri pri
c s W W < ; and if 
5 20
24 33
a a λ < < , then 
pri pri
c s W W > . 
 